The Minnesota Antitrust Law by French, John D.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
1965
The Minnesota Antitrust Law
John D. French
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
French, John D., "The Minnesota Antitrust Law" (1965). Minnesota Law Review. 1639.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1639
The Minnesota Antitrust Law
Mr. French details the distressing condition of the Minne-
sota antitrust law. He considers the statute's history, its
erratic construction by the Minnesota Court, and its re-
lationship to federal law. He also explores the practical
difficulties facing both the practitioner and businessman
under the existing law. The author concludes with several
suggestions for making the Minnesota statute a more
effective and predictable instrument for regulating anti-
competitive behavior.
John D. French*
I.
The temptation exists to regard the Minnesota antitrust law'
as Macbeth regarded life - "a tale told by an idiot, full of sound
and fury signifying nothing."2
"Sound and fury" abound in its provisions. The statute com-
mands that:
No person or association of persons shall enter into any pool, trust
agreement, combination, or understanding whatsoever . . . in restraint
of trade, within this state, or between the people of this or any other
state or country, or which tends in any way or degree to limit, fix, con-
trol, maintain, or regulate the price of any article of trade, manufacture,
or use, bought and sold within the state, or which limits or tends to
limit the production of any such article, or which prevents or limits
competition in the purchase and sale thereof, or which tends or is de-
signed so to do.. ..
Every person violating or assisting in the violation of these pro-
hibitions is guilty of a felony; and punishable, upon conviction,
"by a fine of not less than $500, nor more than $5,000, or by im-
prisonnent . ..for not less than three, nor more than five,
*Member of the Minnesota and District of Columbia bars.
1. The term "Minnesota antitrust law" refers to MnN. STAT. ANN. § 325.81
(Supp. 1964) [formerly MinmN. STAT. §§ 623.01-07 (1961)] which is aimed at
prohibiting combinations in restraint of trade. Related regulatory statutes-
e.g. the Minnesota Fair Trade Act, MmN. STAT. §§ 325.08-.14 (1961), the
"nonsigner" clause of which has been held unconstitutional, Remington Arms
Co. v. G.E.M. of St. Louis, Inc., 257 Minn. 562, 102 N.W.2d 52s (1960),
and the Minnesota price discrimination law, MINN. STAT. § 325.03-.07 (1961)
-are considered only tangentially here.
2. SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, 461 (Act V, Scene V) (Hardin Craig ed. 1961).
3. Min. STAT. ANN. § 325.81, subd. 1 (1964).
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years."4 Further, every domestic corporation that violates or
assists in a violation of the statute "shall" forfeit its corporate
franchises, and guilty foreign corporations "shall" thereafter be
prohibited from doing business in the state. At first glance, these
appear to be sanctions well calculated to keep the business com-
munity on the straight and narrow.
As a practical matter, however, if the statute has signified
something more than "nothing," it has signified very little. En-
forcement activity has been virtually nil for many years." More-
over, any state administration interested in reviving enforcement
activity might have a difficult obstacle to surmount in the deci-
sion in AMF Pinspotters, Inc. v. Harkins Bowling, Inc.7 This was
an action for rent allegedly due under a lease of bowling equip-
ment. In defense, it was urged violations of the Sherman and
Clayton Acts made the lease unenforceable. The court felt this
raised the question whether the Minnesota courts had jurisdiction
to entertain a defense predicated on the federal antitrust laws.
The court appears to have held that issues arising under the fed-
eral antitrust laws, whether raised in attack or defense, are exclu-
sively within the jurisdiction of federal courts and forbidden to
state courts." In the following language the court may also have
held that the Minnesota antitrust law applies only to intrastate
commerce:
It is plaintiff's position that General Talking Pictures Corp. v. De
Marce, 203 Minn. 28, 279 N.W. 750, makes it clear that the Minnesota
4. Ibid.
5. Id. at subd. 2. Subdivisions 3 through 6 provide for the reinstatement of
certain foreign manufacturing corporations upon compliance with affidavit and
fine requirements.
6. Professor Rah recently listed Minnesota among the "moribund" states
whose laws have become "comatose." Rahl, Toward a Worthwhile State Anti-
trust Policy, 39 TEXAs L. REv. 753, 754 (1961). He goes on to state:
There are no reported cases of state enforcement in the annotations in
Illinois since 1905, in Minnesota since 1914, in South Dakota since
1915, in Ohio since 1922, in Kansas since 1923, in Indiana since 1926, in
Nebraska since 1929, or in Michigan since 1933. There is no report of
any state case in Iowa, or North Dakota. Of the thirty-five states re-
porting in the survey conducted by the New York State Bar Associa-
tion Committee in 1956, only five reported any state case since before
World War II.
The state's Attorney General acknowledged in 1962 that its antitrust
legislation had not been used for fifty years. Minnesota Daily, Feb. 27, 1962,
p. 3, col. 1 (address by Attorney General Walter F. Mondale, Feb. 23, 1962).
7. 260 Minn. 499, 110 N.W.2d 348, 46 Mnyl. L. REv. 1135 (1962).
8. Id. at 508, 110 N.W.2d at 353-51.
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antitrust law does not apply to interstate commerce . . . . [U]nder
the record here General Talking Pictures v. De Marce, supra, is con-
trolling.9
Given the comprehensive scope of the concept of interstate com-
merce for antitrust purposes, ° this possible construction would
emasculate the state statute.
However, Pinspotters is arguably far from the last word on the
subject. There is good reason to think the case has not deprived
the statute of its potential significance. Despite the subsequent
reference to the scope of the Minnesota antitrust law, it may well
be that the jurisdictional question was the only one decided, for
the question as posed by the court went only to the jurisdiction
of a state court to entertain federal antitrust defenses." Certainly
that is the import of the court's reliance on General Talking Pic-
tures Corp. v. De Marce 2 as authority for its holding. That case
decided only that state courts are precluded from determining
federal antitrust questions. It said nothing about the applicability
of Minnesota antitrust law to interstate commerce. If General
Talking Pictures was "controlling," only the jurisdictional ques-
tion was decided.' 3 This conclusion is buttressed by reference to
the court's syllabus which mentioned only the jurisdictional issue.
It seems clear from available federal decisions that state courts
have the power to hear federal antitrust defenses in actions
brought under state law,'14 and so even the jurisdictional deter-
mination was probably incorrect.
If Pinspotters did conclude state antitrust law is not applicable
to interstate commerce, such a result would appear to be erron-
eous. In 1950, the Massachusetts Supreme Court said, "We have
seen no case holding that Federal legislation has, in general, dis-
9. Ibid.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S.
460, 464 (1949):
The source of the restraint may be intrastate, as the making of a con-
tract or combination usually is; the application of the restraint may be
intrastate, as it often is; but neither matters if the necessary effect is
to stifle or restrain commerce among the states. If it is interstate com-
merce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the operation
which applies the squeeze.
11. 260 Minn. at 508, 110 N.W.2d at 353-54.
12. 203 Minn. 28, 279 N.W. 750 (1938).
13. A student comment on Pinspotters takes the position that only the
jurisdictional question was treated by the court and that the defendant's re-
lated argument based on the Minnesota antitrust law simply remained un-
answered. 46 Mm. L. REV. 1135 n.1 (1962).
14. See Note, 46 Mn-x. L. REV. 1135 (1962).
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placed State antitrust laws."'i5 Recently the Wisconsin Supreme
Court roundly rejected the federal preemption argument, reasoning
inter alia that the federal laws do not expressly preempt the field;
that there is no inherent conflict of policy; and that the states may
validly exercise their police power in this area for the protection
of their citizens." These arguments seem sound, and their stature
is enhanced by the concurrence of the Justice Department which
has not regarded federal law as preempting the antitrust field.17
One other important consideration leads to the conclusion that
the Minnesota antitrust law was not buried by Pinspotters. It is
said the prerequisite to a quiet funeral is a willing corpse. This
particular "corpse" is unwilling since a private right of action 18
may be exercised without regard for the state's enforcement
policy. Miller v. Minneapolis Underwriters Ass'n, 9 serves as an
illustration. A private plaintiff brought an action to force a for-
feiture of the corporate franchise of the Minneapolis Underwriters
Association on the ground of unreasonable restraint of competi-
tion in the insurance business in violation of the Minnesota anti-
trust law. Judgment was for the defendants, and plaintiff
appealed.
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, but only because
plaintiff had pursued the wrong remedy by failing to proceed by
writ of quo warranto.20 On the question of whether a private plain-
tiff was qualified to begin and conduct charter forfeiture proceed-
ings, the court clearly answered in the affirmative.2' The court
recognized that while indictment and conviction for violation of
the antitrust statute may be made the basis for a charter for-
feiture proceeding, they are not indispensable. 2
15. Commonwealth v. McHugh, 326 Mass. 249, 266, 93 N.E.2d 751, 762
(1950).
16. State v. Allied Chemical & Dye Corp., 9 Wis. 2d 290, 101 N.W.2d 133
(1960). See State v. Southeast Tex. Chapter of Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n,
358 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 969 (1963); RahlI,
supra note 6, at 756-58.
17. See Hearing of Subcommittee No. 3, House Judiciary Committee,
March 1, 1962, p. 20; Note, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 575, 578 (1963). Of course, this
does not mean that in a particular case a peculiar provision of state antitrust
law might not be held invalid because of conflict with federal antitrust policy.
18. Mjw. STAT. ANN. § 325.81, subd. 2 (Supp. 1964).
19. 226 Mim. 367, 33 N.W.2d 48 (1948).
20. The writ of quo warranto has been supplanted in Minnesota by other
procedures. See Town of Burnsville v. City of Bloomington, 264 Minn. 133,
117 N.W.2d 746 (1965).
21. 226 Minn. at 374, 33 N.W.2d at 53.
22.
An action for cancellation of a corporate charter is, however, so dis-
tinctly a civil proceeding that, in the absence of a statutory require-
[Vol. 50:59
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It appears, therefore, that the statute is of sufficient practical
significance to merit further study. Any businessman contemplat-
ing action which may violate the Minnesota antitrust law must
act with regard for the statute or gamble (1) that Pinspotters
actually holds the statute applicable only to intrastate commerce,
a questionable supposition at best, and (2) that his case will be
held, on its facts, to involve interstate commerce. If he is wrong
on either count and wrong on the merits as well, he faces the loss
of his corporate character at the behest of a private party injured
by his conduct, even if the state chooses not to act.24
II.
Minnesota antitrust legislation dates from the latter part of
the nineteenth century,25 when a wave of public sentiment pro-
duced many state antitrust statutes and the Federal Sherman
Act as well.2 6 Three quarters of a century of obscure precedents
would shed little light on the meaning of the Minnesota statute
were it not for a single case, State v. Duluth Board of Trade.
This is not without irony since Duluth Board of Trade seems
clearly to have erred in both branches of its alternative holdings.
The case was a proceeding for forfeiture of the corporate
franchise of the Duluth Board of Trade, a grain exchange, and
for an injunction against the transaction of business under its
rules. The state directed its fire principally at Board Rule 26
which set forth the commission rates deemed just and reasonable
ment to the contrary, a criminal conviction for the violation of the
antitrust statute is neither a condition precedent to the commencement
of the action nor to a judgment of forfeiture. In establishing a basis
for charter forfeiture, a violation of the antitrust statute, § 6523.01, may
be determined independently of any criminal prosecution or conviction.
... The primary purpose of the proceeding is to establish an abuse of
the corporate franchise privilege, irrespective of whether a crime has
been committed, as a basis for adjudging that such abuse constitutes a
forfeiture of the charter.....
226 Minn. at 373-74, 33 N.W.2d at 52-53.
23. See text accompanying notes 10-17 sumpra. Mosk, State Antitrust
Enforcement and Coordination With Federal Enforcement, 21 A.B.A. Antitrust
Section Rep. 358, 864-68 (1962).
24. Presumably a foreign corporation is equally in jeopardy of loss of its
right to transact business in the state at the instance of a private party,
since the section of the statute authorizing this private right of action is the
same as that which authorizes the private right of action for charter for-
feiture approved in the Miller case.
25. See State v. Duluth Board of Trade, 107 Minn. 506, 515-17, 191 N.W.
395, 898-99 (1909).
26. See Wilson, The State Antitrust Laws, 47 A.B.AJ. 160 (1961); Note, 32
Co.Lir. L. REv. 347 (1932).
27. 107 Minn. 506, 121 N.W. S95 (1909).
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and fixed a fine for charging less than the established fees.18 Judg-
ment below was for the defendants, and the Minnesota Supreme
Court affirmed, resting its decision on two grounds. First, relying
on decisions involving labor unions, the court said, "The right of
laboring men to combine for the purpose of regulating their
wages can no longer be seriously denied."2 From this the court
reasoned a "rule of law applicable to men who work with their
hands should . . . be equally applicable . . . to men whose work
is more intellectual."30 The court also found labor was not an
"article" or "commodity" within the meaning of the statute,3 and
thus concluded that combinations "to fix the charges that shall
be made for personal services, are not within the prohibitions of
the statute."32 In the alternative the court found Rule 26 did not
violate the statute because it did not make a monopoly, restrain
trade, or control the price or production of any item of trade. The
court believed that so long as the commission rate was reasonable,
it was as beneficial to require that it be uniform as to require
uniformity in railroad freight rates.33 While in a remote and in-
direct way the rule might affect price, "contracts and agreements
for certain uniform charges, which are for the benefit of all and
operate only indirectly on production and prices, are not within
the prohibitions of the statute. '34
If this were all there was to Duluth Board of Trade, it would
stand for very little. Its first point- that the statute does not
apply to personal services - was all but overruled in Campbell v.
Motion Picture Mach. Operators' Union3 5 Further, the view that
a fixed, uniform commission charge is permissible if the rate is
reasonable is completely at odds with the generally accepted mod-
ern rule that a combination to fix prices is illegal per se.36
28. Id. at 515, 121 N.W. at 397-98.
29. Id. at 546, 121 N.W. at 411.
so. Ibid.
31. Id. at 546-47, 121 N.W. at 412.
39. Id. at 550, 121 N.W. at 413.
33. Ibid.
34. Id. at 551, 121 N.W. at 414.
35. 151 Mun. 220, 186 N.W. 781 (1992). The court held the statute appli-
cable to labor union activities and declared that any contrary implications of
Duluth Board of Trade "were not intended as a decision of the point" and
"must, therefore, be limited to the facts there before the court." Id. at 230,
186 N.W. at 784. The court found the expression "trade" to include labor.
Id. at 231, 186 N.W. at 784.
36. See, e.g., Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340
U.S. 211 (1951); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
Perhaps the closest support for Duluth Board of Trade available in currently
[Vol. 50:59
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But Duluth Board of Trade reaches beyond its immediate
facts. No other Minnesota opinion so thoroughly canvasses the
history of the law on restraints of trade. In the course of this sur-
vey, the court points out that:
The Minnesota anti-trust law is framed along the lines of the
federal statute, although it is more diffuse. It may fairly be assumed,
however, that the general purpose of all statutes of this kind is the
same, and we may therefore properly look to the decisions made under
federal and state statutes of a similar character for the principle by
which to construe our own statute . . .3
This principle of harmonious construction has become firmly fixed
in Minnesota law. Paradoxically, it provided the rationale in
Campbell v. Motion Picture Mach. Operators' Union38 for dis-
carding the Duluth Board of Trade conclusion that the statute is
inapplicable to personal services 9 In Campbell the court said
that if the Minnesota act is to be construed in conformity with
constructions of the Sherman Act, it must apply "to combina-
tions of employers as well as to combinations of employees." 40
authoritative precedent is Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231
(1918), which upheld a rule prohibiting Board members from purchasing be-
tween the close of one session and the commencement of the next at other than
the closing bid. However, the object here was not to fix the price but only
"the period of price-making," and any analogy between this practice and the
one considered in Duluth Board of Trade seems inapposite. See the manner
in which Board of Trade is distinguished in United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., supra.
37. 107 Minn. at 517, 121 N.W. at 399. A similar conclusion had been
reached by a federal court in Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 123 Fed.
692 (C.C.D. Minn. 1903), rev'd, 194 U.S. 48 (1904), which was cited in Duluth
Board of Trade.
38. 151 Minn. 220, 228-29, 186 N.W. 781, 783 (1922). The court said:
The Sherman Act went into effect July 2, 1890; the original of our own
anti-trust act, on April 20, 1891. Its genesis was outlined in State v.
Duluth Board of Trade, 107 Minn. 506, 121 N.W. 395, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.)
1260, where it was said that the statute was framed along the lines of
the Sherman Act; that the general purpose of all such statutes is the
same, and that this court may properly look to decisions made under
Federal and state statutes of a similar character for the principle by
which to construe our statute.
39. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
40. 151 inn. at 230, 186 N.W. at 784. More recently the court has said:
Where the state government, acting independently in its own sphere,
copies a federal statute, the state act will be construed to have the same
meaning as the federal act. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Paine &
Nixon Co., 182 Minn. 159, 234 N.W. 453. In Campbell v. Motion Pic-
ture Mach. Operators' Union, 151 Minn. 220, 229, 186 N.W. 781, 27
A.L.R. 681, the question was whether the state antitrust law should be
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:59
Campbell indicates the court's intention to adhere to this rule of
conformity with Sherman Act decisions even to the extent of
overruling prior Minnesota precedents. 41
In sum, we are left to find the meaning of the state law in fed-
eral cases. However, two important caveats must be noted. First,
it is unlikely that any but Sherman Act precedents are authori-
tative. It is that statute from which the state law was derived,
and it is to that statute the court has referred in invoking the
doctrine of uniform construction. Other federal antitrust statutes
were subsequently drafted to accomplish results not thought to be
attainable under the Sherman Act. 42 Given the doctrine of uni-
form construction, those results should be equally unattainable
under the staM act in the absence of similar supplementary legis-
lation.4 Second, not all Sherman Act law is in point. That statute
prohibits not only contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in
restraint of trade,4 4 but individual monopolization and attempts
construed the same as the Sherman federal antitrust act, from which it
was copied. There were persuasive arguments against the construction
of the Sherman Act adopted by the federal courts. We held that the
state statute was intended to have the same meaning as the federal act
and followed the federal rule, pointing out that it would be anomalous
to have the state and federal courts applying different rules to the same
facts under identical provisions of law....
Christgau v. Woodlawn Cemetery Ass'n, 208 Minn. 263, 276, 293 N.W. 619,
625 (1940).
41. See 151 Minn. at 229-30, 186 N.W. at 784.
42. For example, the Supreme Court states in Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 318 n.32 (1962):
That § 7 of the Clayton Act was intended to reach incipient monopolies
and trade restraints outside the scope of the Sherman Act was explicitly
stated in the Senate Report on the original Act. S. Rep. No. 698, 63d
Cong. 2d Sess. 1.
43. Several supplementary state laws have been enacted. See note 1 supra.
United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 507 n.7 (1948) permits
consideration of Clayton Act policy in a Sherman Act case, but it recognizes
the distinctions between these statutes. See id. at 522 n.19. The differences are
also acknowledged in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345
U.S. 594, 609-10 (1953), in which the Court said:
While the Clayton Act's more specific standards illuminate the public
policy which the Sherman Act was designed to subserve ... the Govern-
ment here must measure up to the criteria of the more stringent law.
As Justice Harlan stated in dissent in United States v. First National Bank &
Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665, 679 n.10 (1964):
It is one thing to say... that "the Clayton Act's more specific stand-
ards illuminate the public policy which the Sherman Act was designed
to subserve ... " It is quite another thing to treat them as inter-
changeable.
44. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
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to monopolize as well.45 The state act, on the other hand, forbids
only collective action, i.e., "any pool, trust agreement, combina-
tion, or understanding," with another in restraint of trade 6
While section 1 of the Sherman Act dealing with contracts, com-
binations, and conspiracies, was copied,4 7 section 2 on monopolies
was ignored. Thus, there is a strong inference that individual
attempts to monopolize are not covered. This inference is strength-
ened by the fact that other statutes have prohibited individual
attempts to monopolize, indicating that the concept is not un-
familiar to the state legislature."
This does not mean that restraints assailable under the federal
Clayton Act,49 for example, are entirely immune from state prose-
cution because the state has failed to enact a copy of that statute.
It does mean that such restraints must attain the level of Sher-
man Act violations before they violate the state law. To be suc-
cessfully prosecuted at the state level, they must amount to com-
binations whose actual purpose or effect is restraint of trade of
the sort prescribed by the Sherman Act, rather than combinations
that merely portend of a future restraint of trade in violation of
the less stringent incipiency standards of the Clayton Act. Corpo-
rate mergers provide a prime example of a type of business ac-
tivity to which this important distinction is applicable. Under
section 7 of the Clayton Act, a merger may be prevented if its
effect "may be substantially to lessen competition," 50 i.e., if, "at
the time of suit, there is a reasonable probability that the acquisi-
tion is likely to result in the condemned restraints." 51 The state
statute, derived from the Sherman Act and lacking provisions
aimed at such incipient restraints, cannot be invoked unless the
merger is of such magnitude as to bring about an immediate
45. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
46. AIMN. STAT. ANN. § 325.81 (Supp. 1964).
47. Only section 1 is mentioned in State v. Duluth Board of Trade, 107
linn. 506, 517, 121 N.W. 395, 399 (1909).
48. For example, Alm. STAT. Armx. § 325.82 (Supp. 1964) forbids any per-
son to discriminate in the price of petroleum products for the purpose of
creating a monopoly. Similarly, under MmxN. STAT. § 235.10 (1961) it is un-
lawful to discriminate in price in the purchase of grain with the intention of
creating a monopoly.
It is not unique for a state law to prohibit only collective action. For
example, this is true of the Wisconsin statute. See Comments, 1951 Wis. L.
RFEv. 657.
49. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1964).
50. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
51. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 358 U.S. 586, 607
(1957).
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restraint of trade upon consummation. Thus, of the many federal
merger cases, only those bottomed on the Sherman Act provide
authority for decisions under the state law 2
Given the Sherman Act precedents, and the rule that the state
act is to be construed to harmonize with section 1 of the Sherman
Act, one may sketch the broad outlines of present Minnesota anti-
trust law.53 First, not every restraint of trade is unlawful;5 4 only
those that unduly restrict competition. On the other hand, this
"rule of reason" does not permit the defendant to attempt to
excuse business activity which is inherently anticompetitive.
There are:
... certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively
presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate in-
quiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse
for their use. This principle of per se unreasonableness not only
makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by the Sherman
Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also
avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged
economic investigation into the entire history of the industry involved,
as well as related industries, in an effort to determine at large whether
a particular restraint has been unreasonable- an inquiry so often
wholly fruitless when undertaken. Among the practices which the courts
have heretofore deemed to be unlawful in and of themselves are price
fixing; United States v. Soeony-Vacuum Oil Co., 810 U.S. 150; division
of markets, United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 971,
aff'd 175 U.S. 211; group boycotts, Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal
Trade Comm.'n, 812 U.S. 457; and tying arrangements, International
Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 892.55
Unless a practice falls into this category of per se offenses, its
lawfulness or unlawfulness depends on an analysis of its purposes
and economic effects under the prevailing circumstances. The
52. For the most recent Sherman Act merger case, see United States v.
First National Bank & Trust Co., 876 U.S. 665 (1964). A six-party consolida-
tion was held illegal under state law in State v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co.,
110 Minn. 415, 126 N.W. 623 (1910), but the exact significance of this deci-
sion is unclear due to its emphasis on the sham nature of the transaction as
merely a "nominal purchase."
United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 834 U.S. 495, 507 n.7 (1948), does
not detract from the conclusions drawn above. See notes 42 & 43 supra.
58. The word "sketch" is used advisedly, for the subject is far too vast to
permit more than passing mention of its highlights here. The practitioner
faced with a specific Minnesota antitrust problem should consult the pre-
cedents under section 1 of the Sherman Act in detail.
54. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 2921 U.S. 1 (1911).
55. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 856 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
[Vol. 50:59
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relevant lines of inquiry in distinguishing per se offenses from
conduct that may be lawful under the rule of reason are indicated
by the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in White
Motor Co. v. United States." The complaint alleged, and the
defendant admitted, among other things, that each distributor of
trucks manufactured by defendant was given an exclusive sales
territory and required not to sell outside that territory; and that
no such distributor was permitted to sell defendant's trucks to
any governmental agency without the manufacturer's written
consent. The district court considered these per se violations of
the Sherman Act and granted the Government summary judg-
ment.5 7 On direct appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and re-
manded for trial.
Three dissenting justices agreed with the court below. They
thought the defendant's argument boiled down to an assertion
that the foregoing restraints were required to permit defendant
to compete with larger and more powerful competitors. In reject-
ing the possibility of demonstrating that the restraints were
reasonable because of business necessity, the dissent said the
"rule of reason" is inapplicable to agreements made solely for
the purpose of eliminating competition (here, between defendant's
distributors). For this reason, the dissenting justices thought re-
mand of the case for trial was futile, since it would not be possible
for the defendant corporation to adduce facts upon which a suc-
cessful defense could be predicated.
The majority, on the other hand, believed that no decision
was possible in the absence of evidence showing the effects of the
challenged practices. It was recognized that there is no need for a
trial to show the nature and extent of such per se unlawful prac-
tices as the tie-in sale of an unpatented product with a patented
article, the division of markets by competitors, group boycotts,
or price-fixing arrangements. The majority pointed out, however,
that this was the first case on vertically imposed territorial restric-
tions, and it reiterated the thinking of Board of Trade v. United
States"' that courts must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar
to the business before they can decide whether a restraint pro-
motes or suppresses competition. The question was whether de-
fendant's conduct was so pernicious in its effect on competition as
to lack any redeeming virtue. The court concluded that it did
56. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
57. 194 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ohio 1961).
58. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
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"not know enough of the economic and business stuff out of which
these arrangements emerge to be certain."5
It is worth noting that the "rule of reason" has long played
a part in state restraint of trade cases ° Of particular importance
is the role the rule has had, either explicitly or implicitly, in the
numerous decisions involving restraints that are merely ancillary
to some legitimate business transaction, such as the sale of a busi-
ness or the formation of an employment relationship. For example,
one person may agree to buy the business of another, but only
on condition that the seller refrain from resuming the same sort
of business in the same city for a specified period of time. Or one
person may agree to employ another, but only on condition that
the employee not enter into competition with the employer for a
specified period of time following the termination of his employ-
ment. The lawfulness of these arrangements in Minnesota has
always been tested by reference to questions bearing on their
reasonableness: e.g., whether the covenantee had a legitimate in-
terest to protect; whether the restraint was suitable to the pro-
tection of that interest; and whether the covenantor was unduly
limited in earning a livelihoodP' In this respect, the Minnesota
approach is in accord with the prevailing approach in other juris-
dictions62 and appears to harmonize with Sherman Act decisions
as well
s
Even if conduct is found to impose a serious restraint on trade,
it will not be unlawful under the state act unless it is the product
of a collective actionP 4 Here the Sherman Act precedents on
59. 372 U.S. at 263. Mr. Justice Brennan joined the opinion of the Court
but also wrote a separate concurrence which implies that a "rule of reason"
approach may be applicable to territorial restrictions on distributors but not
to customer restrictions.
60. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Paine & Nixon Co., 182 Minn.
159, 234 N.W. 453 (1930); State v. Duluth Board of Trade, 107 Minn. 506,
121 N.W. 395 (1909).
61. See, e.g., Peoples Cleaning & Dyeing Co. v. Share, 168 Minn. 474, 210
N.W. 397 (1926); Granger v. Craven, 159 Minn. G96, 199 N.W. 10 (1924); The
Menter Co. v. Brock, 147 Minn. 407, 180 N.W. 553 (1920); Holliston v. Ern-
ston, 124 Minn. 49, 144 N.W. 415 (1913); Espenson v. Koepke, 93 Minn. 278,
101 N.W. 168 (1904).
62. See Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HAzv. L. REv.
625 (1960); Annot., 46 A.LR.2d 119 (1956); Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 77 (1956);
Annot., 43 A.L.R2d 94 (1955); Annot., 41 AL2R.2d 15 (1955).
63. See United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41
(D. Del. 1953), aff'd, 351 U.S. 377 (1956); Foundry Services, Inc. v. Beneflux
Corp., 110 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y.), revd on other grounds, 206 F.2d 214
(2d Cir. 1953); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th
Cir. 1898), mod. and af'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
64. See text accompanying notes 44-48 supra.
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what constitutes a contract, combination, or conspiracy provide
a guide for decision. It is obvious that collective action requires
the participation of two or more persons, but it is not always
obvious when this has been the case. The most difficult questions
arise in a corporate setting. Under the leading decisions, the fact
of common ownership or control does not insulate corporate
defendants from antitrust liability. For example, wholly owned
subsidiaries of the same parent can be held to have conspired 5
On the other hand, it is recognized that a corporation can act only
throught its agents. Thus, a complaint which alleges only that a
corporation has acted in combination with its own officers or
agents in their normal capacities as such fails to state a cause
of action based on conspiracy 6 However, once it is shown that
a combination has been formed with the purpose or effect of
unreasonably restraining trade, a violation of the law is estab-
lished. That is, the combination itself violates the statute, and no
overt act in furtherance of its purpose need be proved.6 7
Because direct evidence of an antitrust conspiracy customarily
is not easy to obtain, proving the conspiracy is often more diffi-
cult for the enforcing authority than proving that trade has been
unduly restrained. Courts have recognized this problem and have
accepted evidence of the conduct of the defendants as evidence
of concerted action. It is therefore possible to infer conspiracy,
for example, when many members of a retail trade association
cease to do business with wholesalers upon report from the asso-
ciation that the wholesalers have sold directly to consumers 8 As
the Supreme Court has said, "Acceptance by competitors, with-
out previous agreement, of an invitation to participate in a plan,
the necessary consequence of which, if carried out, is restraint of
interstate commerce, is sufficient to establish an unlawful con-
spiracy under the Sherman Act.""9 On the other hand, parallel
business behavior does not conclusively establish agreement and
65. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211
(1951); see United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
66. Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953); see ATT'y GEN. NAT' Com i . Ari-
TRUST REP. 31 (1955).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224
n.59 (1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
Mnqx. STAT. ANN. § 325.81 (Supp. 1964) prohibits not only those combinations
which restrain trade but those which "tend" or are "designed" to limit com-
petition. That is, simply forming a combination with the "design" of prevent-
ing competition violates the act.
68. Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S.
600 (1914).
69. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939).
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is not an offense in itself. Standing alone the fact that none of a
group of major motion picture distributors would sell first-run pic-
tures to a particular theater - there being evidence of individual
business reasons for their refusal - did not dictate a finding of
conspiracy."0
The Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to
Study the Antitrust Laws suggests that:
The significance of uniform action may depend, in any one instance,
on a variety of factors. How pervasive is the uniformity? Does it extend
to price alone or to all other terms and conditions of sale? How nearly
identical is -the uniformity? How long has the uniformity continued?
What is the time lag, if any, between a change by one competitor and
that of the other or others? Is the product involved homogeneous or
differentiated? In the case of price uniformity, have the defendants
raised as well as lowered prices in parallel fashion? Can the conduct,
no matter how uniform, be adequately explained by independent busi-
ness justifications? Upon the answers to questions like these depends
the weight to be accorded parallel action in any given case.71
m111.
As we have seen, observance of the rule that the Minnesota act
is to be construed in harmony with section 1 of the Sherman Act
is of paramount importance in the application of the state law.
The significance of the rule invites, indeed requires, an appraisal
of its soundness. Is it desirable that the state act be uniformly
interpreted in the light of the federal precedents? For a number
of reasons I think the answer is yes.
First, it should not be forgotten that antitrust legislation regu-
lates and is imposed upon an extraordinarily complicated pattern
of modern commercial activity. Multistate business operations are
common, subjecting the entrepreneur to the regulatory jurisdic-
tion not only of the federal government but state governments
as well. The practical burdens of compliance with all applicable
laws can be serious and expensive. When the policies of the state
and federal laws are substantially similar, as here, adherence to
a rule of uniform construction makes considerable sense because
it avoids wasteful complexity."2
70. Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S.
537 (1954). The court said: "Circumstantial evidence of consciously parallel
behavior may have made heavy inroads into the traditional judicial attitude
toward conspiracy; but 'conscious parallelism' has not yet read conspiracy out
of the Sherman Act entirely." Id. at 541.
71. ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L Coim. ANTrmuST REP. 39 (1955).
72. See Stern, A Proposed Uniform State Antitrust Law: Text and C om-
mentary on a Draft Statute, 39 TExAs L. Rnv. 717, 718-20 (1961).
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Further, it is a real question whether there would be any way
of knowing what the Minnesota law is about without reference
to federal precedents. Few statutes are couched in more general
language, and the state's comparative inactivity in enforcing the
act has left it without the judicial gloss it sorely needs. By
contrast with the handful of cases under the Minnesota law, one
may look to literally hundreds under the Sherman Act. Pre-
dictability, so essential to both business and litigation decision-
making, dictates reliance on the federal authorities.73
State precedents, when they exist, often raise more problems
than they solve. For one thing, most are antiques; a half century
of governmental nonenforcement 74 has assured that. Cases de-
cided during the formative period of antitrust activity often rep-
resent outmoded economic and legal thinking, long since dis-
carded. Duluth Board of Trade75 is a prime example. An agree-
ment to fix a uniform rate of brokerage commissions would not be
upheld today, in the face of powerful federal authorities holding
price-fixing unlawful per se." Cases like Duluth Board of Trade
admirably reveal law in process; an attempt, and a genuinely
scholarly one, to find a path in a wilderness of unfamiliar legisla-
tion. But 50 years of additional searching have carried antitrust
theory a good deal further, and there is no reason for Minnesota
law to remain static simply because most of that search has
occurred in other jurisdictions.
Moreover, Minnesota's restraint of trade cases often display a
disconcerting disregard for the existence of the statute. For
example, in Brainerd Dispatch Newspaper Co. v. County of Crow
Wing,77 the plaintiff, a newspaper publisher, obtained agreement
from all other newspaper publishing companies in its county that
it would submit the only bid to the county board for printing and
circulating official county printing. The board was aware of this
arrangement but nonetheless accepted plaintiff's bid at the high-
est legal rate. Later, the board refused to pay plaintiff's bill for
73. "Federal precedents are so numerous, by contrast with state cases, and
so convenient to cite that even in matters where the state and federal statutes
differ it is common to find the lawyers on both sides and the courts being
guided by them." Sieker, The Role of the States in Antitrust Law Enforcement
-Some Views and Observations, 39 TEXAS L. REV. 873, 878 (1961).
74. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
75. State v. Duluth Board of Trade, 107 Minn. 506, 121 N.W. 395 (1909),
discussed in notes 26-39 supra and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340
U.S. 211 (1951); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
77. 196 Mlinn. 194, 264 N.W. 779 (1936). See also Cain v. County of
Wabasha, 164 linn. 142, 204 N.W. 916, 917 (1925).
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work done on the ground that the contract was illegal. A directed
verdict for plaintiff was affirmed. The only question raised was
whether there was fraud and collusion in submitting the bid. The
court held there was no fraud or collusion because the arrange-
ment among the newspapers was open rather than secret. The
state antitrust statute was not mentioned or considered.
One is at a loss to know how to interpret this type of decision.
It cannot be read as sanctioning bid rigging, one of the most
venerable and obvious forms of price fixing s Yet how this theory
could have been overlooked, particularly with the public interest
so clearly at stake in a case involving a government contract,
is difficult to fathom. Perhaps the statute had simply fallen into
such thoroughgoing disuse that everyone had forgotten it. In any
event, cases of this sort which ignore antitrust problems and the
antitrust statute make far less convincing authority than federal
decisions which explicitly face and resolve the issues.
Finally, there are the areas in which reference to a federal rule
is needed simply because state authorities, though plentiful, are
uninstructive. Minnesota boycott cases provide a striking illus-
tration. These are the most numerous, and the least clear anti-
trust cases decided under the statute. To illustrate this confusion,
consider the following fact situations and try to guess how the
court came out:
A. Defendants, retail lumber dealers, organized in a voluntary
association, formally agree to refuse to deal with lumber manu-
facturers or wholesalers who sell directly to retail customers
at any location at which an agreeing dealer maintains a yard
unless the manufacturer or wholesaler will pay the associated
dealers a 10 per cent fine on such sales. Any dealer continuing to
do business with the offending manufacturer or wholesaler will be
expelled from the dealers' association. An offending manufacturer
who refuses to pay the 10 per cent sues to prevent the boycott,
alleging a potential loss of profits.
B. A produce exchange has bylaws regulating the credit of
members, requiring that the purchase of butter and eggs from
78. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946);
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); United
States v. Swift & Co., 52 F. Supp. 476 (D. Col. 1948); RESTATMNT, CoN-
A cTs § 517 (1932): "A bargain not to bid at an auction, or any public com-
petition for a sale or contract, having as its primary object to stifle competi-
tion, is illegal." Furthermore, the Minnesota Supreme Court has manifested
stern disapproval of bid rigging on other occasions. Regan v. Babcock, 188
Nfinn. 192, 247 N.W. 12 (1938); State ex rel. Barnes v. Tauer, 178 Minn. 484,
227 N.W. 499 (1929).
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nonmembers be at a less favorable price than from members,
controlling the delivery time of goods sold, and providing penal-
ties by fine or suspension for certain offenses and defaults. Plain-
tiff sells in violation of the bylaws and is first fined, then, after
refusing to pay, is suspended. He sues the exchange and its mem-
bers for combining to ruin his business by not selling to or buying
from him and influencing others to do the same.
C. Defendant musicians' union has a rule prohibiting mem-
bers from playing in orchestras of less than a minimum size, not
composed solely of union men. A theater owner sues to enjoin
enforcement of the rule.
D. Defendant union pickets a theater for the purpose of
persuading the owner to stop operating the projection machines
himself and hire union labor to do the job. The theater owner
sues for damages and an injunction against further picketing.
Does it help to know that two of the foregoing represent lawful
combinations and two do not? Those who have played the game
may check their answers against the decisions of the court.
Case A is Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Holli&,79 and its holding is that the
lumber dealers' boycott was not actionable. Inexplicably, the
court could see no element of coercion or intimidation in the facts,
and it did not consider the presence of a conspiracy significant.
Any man, it thought, may lawfully refuse to deal with any other,
and "the right which one man may exercise singly, many, after
consultation, may agree to exercise jointly . ... 0
Case B, Ertz v. Produce Exchange Co.,"' distinguished Bohn
and affirmed an order of the trial court overruling defendants'
demurrer. It seemed to the court that the defendants in Bohn had
a "legitimate interest" to protect while those in Ertz did not.
The court found the produce exchange was "clearly a combination
in restraint of trade, [which] tends to limit or control the market
price of articles of produce, and limits and interferes with open and
free competition in the purchase and sale of commodities....,,s8
79. 54 Minn. 223, 55 N.W. 1119 (1898).
80. Id. at 235, 55 N.W. at 1121. This conclusion appears unsound even at
common law, quite apart from the statute. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcTS
§ 515 Illustration 15 (1932):
A number of wholesale grocers constituting most of those engaged
in the trade in a section of the country agree with one another not to
buy from manufacturers who sell directly to retail dealers. The pur-
pose is to prevent cutting of prices and to maintain wholesale dealers
in their monopoly of acting as middlemen. The agreement is illegal.
81. 82 Ainn. 173, 84 N.W. 743 (1901).
82. Id. at 178-79, 84 N.W. at 745.
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Why these remarks lack applicability to the lumber boycott in
Bohn is not readily apparent.
In Case C, Scott-Stafford Opera House Co. v. Minneapolis
Musicians Ass'n,s3 the court returned to its position in Bohn and
held Ertz inapplicable. Here the defendants were seen to have a
"legitimate" common interest, as they were thought to have had
in Bohn, and not to have displayed any "malice," as they were
thought to have done in Ertz. The rule was therefore valid.
Finally, we arrive at Case D, Rorabach v. Motion Picture
Mach. Operators' Union.84 The court rebelled at a rule that would
require a theater owner to substitute another for himself as
projectionist. Ertz and similar cases were deemed in point, since
the court felt the union's efforts were aimed at accomplishing an
"unlawful purpose." "One man singly, or any number of men
jointly, having no legitimate interests to protect, may not law-
fully ruin the business of another by maliciously inducing his
patrons and third parties not to deal with him." 5 While the
court would not reverse the trial court's denial of a temporary
injunction, it indicated that the plaintiff would be entitled to re-
lief if his proof bore out his allegations.
Judge Larson recently wrestled manfully with these and other
Minnesota boycott cases in Continental Research, Inc. v. Crut-
tenden, Podesta & Miller,6 and concluded that they "are difficult
to reconcile. ' 87 An excerpt from his remarks admirably illuminates
the problem:
The refusal to deal in the Bohn Mfg. Co. case was no less harmful
to the plaintiff than the refusal to deal in Rorabach v. Motion Pictures
Mach. Operators' Union, and an injunction was authorized against the
defendants in the latter case and not in the former. The Court in Rora-
bach v. Motion Pictures Mach. Operators' Union held that -the purpose
sought by the defendants was an unlawful one, but the plaintiff there
had the same choice that the plaintiff in Bohn Mfg. Co. had - he could
act in the manner that suited him best (and face pressure from the de-
fendants) or he could yield to the will of the defendants and alleviate
the pressure upon him. If the plaintiff in Rorabach had been compelled
to hire more workers than he needed, this was no more than the plaintiff
had to do in Scott-Stafford Opera House Company v. Minneapolis Mu-
sicians Ass'n, where the Court held that it was permissible for the union
to strike for the purpose of achieving maximum employment of its
members .... 88
83. 118 Minn. 410, 136 N.W. 1092 (1912).
84. 140 Minn. 481, 168 N.W. 766 (1918).
85. Id. at 484, 168 N.W. at 766.
86. 222 F. Supp. 190 (D. Minn. 1963).
87. Id. at 207.
88. Ibid.
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One may profitably contrast this confusion with the federal
rule that concerted refusals to deal are unlawful per se. 9 If it is
objected that such a per se rule is a blunt instrument for dealing
with a subtle economic problem, the Minnesota boycott cases are
documentary evidence of the result of an attempt to solve such
problems by means of a case-by-case analysis °0 Moreover, the
federal rule is not merely the product of hasty judicial fiat but the
result of careful consideration and rejection of the view that so
serious a form of restraint on trade can be economically justi-
fied." Not only legal certainty but economic theory will usually
benefit when a clear-cut federal rule supplants a muddled string
of inconsistent state precedents.
Clearly, therefore, it is desirable that state antitrust law be
formulated to harmonize with the precedents under section I of
the Sherman Act, and the court avowedly intends so to do. The
question arises how far this principle should be carried. The
answer, it seems, has already been correctly given in the Camp-
bell'2 case, which indicates that federal law is to be followed even
at the expense of abandoning prior state precedents 3 Only in
this way can the state law, so meagerly and sporadically de-
veloped, stay abreast of modern antitrust thinking and yield the
predictability of decision so important to both the lawyer and the
businessman. State cases should continue to be authoritative only
if they are based on federal decisions of continuing validity or if
they speak to questions not yet answered under the federal statute.
IV.
To say the present principle underlying application of the state
antitrust law is sound, even if some specific applications of it have
not been, is not to conclude that the present posture of Minnesota
antitrust law is satisfactory. It remains to inquire whether the
structure of the state's trade regulation legislation is adequate.
The answer seems apparent; the structure of the state's legis-
lation on trade regulation is not adequate. The existing situation
89. E.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Radiant
Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961); Klor's,
Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Originators'
Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
90. See the quotation from Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S.
1, 5 (1958), in the text accompanying note 55 supra.
91. See, e.g., Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
92. Campbell v. Motion Picture Operators' Union, 151 Minn. 220, 186
N.W. 781 (1922). See notes 35, 36 supra and text accompanying note 41.
93. For example, Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United
States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914), would overrule Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn.
223, 55 N.W. 119 (1893) and supplant it as Minnesota authority.
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is almost as unsatisfactory as it could be. The only positive factor
is the rule of uniform construction of the state act with section 1
of the Sherman Act. This rule, if faithfully observed, can give the
state law discernible meaning it would otherwise lack.
The total impact of the state antitrust law can best be summed
up in this hypothetical reply letter from a practitioner to a client
who has requested an opinion on how Minnesota antitrust law
would eflect his business.
1. Although the Minnesota antitrust law has been on the books for
approximately three quarters of a century, it has seldom been en-
forced. Apparently it will be construed to achieve the same results
as section 1 of the Sherman Act, but there are several old cases
under the state law that are out of harmony with contemporary
Sherman Act interpretation. We think the modern Sherman Act
precedents should prevail in case of conflict, but we are not entirely
certain of such an outcome.
2. Whatever the content of the state law, it may not apply to your
interstate transactions. This is a matter of great uncertainty, how-
ever. One Minnesota decision points in this direction but the weight
of authority elsewhere is to the contrary. Further, there is consider-
able confusion about what are interstate, as opposed to intrastate,
transactions.
3. Assuming that your business is governed by the statute you are
probably affected only to the extent that you act in concert with an-
other or others. This means, for example, that you apparently have
the right, except as qualified by a variety of special statutes,
94 to
attempt to monopolize your line of commerce in Minnesota as long
as you do so individually.
4. Even if you engage in conduct prohibited by the statute, you are
probably safe from state prosecution, for the state has not enforced
the act for over fifty years.
5. On the other hand, an injured competitor may sue under the statute
and may obtain, inter alia, forfeiture of your corporate charter.
6. In summary, the content of the statute is somewhat uncertain; the
scope of applicability of the statute is most uncertain; the chances
that the statute will be invoked against you are small, perhaps even
slight; but the possible sanction in the event that you are found in
violation of the statute is extremely severe.
A statutory scheme which reduces the practitioner (to say
nothing of his befuddled client) to this sort of conjecture is an
intolerable mess. Corrective action must be taken.
As a first step, it'would be appropriate for the legislature to
address itself to the most fundamental of questions - should the
state have an antitrust law at all? This is no idle suggestion. "A
record of a half century of inactivity creates a strong presumption
94. See, e.g., those statutes described in note 48 supra. Of course, if the
business practice restrains interstate commerce, § 2 of the Sherman Act applies.
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that state antitrust law is neither needed nor desired .... 9
Further, it is possible to advance a number of arguments for
repeal, e.g.:
(1) The experience and capabilities of the federal judiciary and enforce-
ment agencies, developed during the period of state inactivity, suggests
that federal laws are better equipped to achieve the results that are
being sought; (2) the private [litigant] does not suffer since a treble
damage action usually is available under the federal law no matter how
local the restraints; (3) the state can recover for damages to the public
under federal law; (4) exclusion of state control would eliminate the
problem of double penalties in dual prosecution.96
But the rebuttal to these arguments seems more convincing.
First, and most important, federal regulation is not all pervasive.
Essentially local enterprises such as bowling alleys, barber shops,
mortuaries, taicabs, drive-in theaters, and newspapers have all
been held, at one time or another, to lie outside the scope of
federal antitrust legislation. 97 Price-fixing, bid rigging, con-
certed refusals to deal, and the like can be equally as injurious to
competitors and prejudicial to the interests of consumers at the
intrastate level as they are at the interstate level where such
activities are rigidly prohibited. Any doubts in this regard vanish
when one examines the experience of New York, Texas, and Wis-
consin, the states which have led the way in vigorous antitrust
enforcement. In these states there have been a multitude of suc-
cessful prosecutions of hard core per se offenses. As of 1963, Wis-
consin had a perfect record in suits against antitrust violators.9 8
It seems unlikely that local abuses of the free enterprise system
in Minnesota are less numerous or flagrant. The difference is that
here they are simply not prosecuted.99
95. Rahl, Toward a Worthwhile State Antitrust Policy, 39 TExAs L. Rnv.
753, 755 (1961). Professor Rahl goes on to say:
The simple fact is that most of the many thousands of Attorneys
General and county attorneys in past years, in the inactive states hav-
ing state laws, have regarded the use of state power against business
restraints as so unimportant as to warrant not even one enforcement
case in their whole period in office.
Id. at 765.
96. Hanson & von Kalinowski, The Status of State Antitrust Laws With
Federal Analysis, 15 W. REs. L. REv. 9, 30 (1963); Note, 61 CoLum. L. :REv.
1469, 1494 (1961).
97. See Hanson & von IKalinowski, supra note 96, at 31; Krotinger, The
"Essentially Local" Doctrine and Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 W. RES. L.
REv. 66, 75-76 (1963).
98. Note, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 575, 583 n.58 (1963).
99. Some reasons why the need for state antitrust enforcement is likely to
grow are advanced in Sieker, supra note 73, at 874-75.
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Moreover, federal enforcement is not entirely adequate even
within the clearly assignable sphere of federal jurisdiction. Neither
the Justice Department nor the Federal Trade Commission has
the manpower or resources to proceed against every conceivable
antitrust infringement affecting interstate commerce. They must
give priority to practices burdening multistate markets; they need
and desire state enforcement activity as a supplement and com-
plement to their own programs. 100 "Vigorous state antitrust law
enforcement thus appears necessary to insure the protection of the
local market places of the states."' 0 ' "It is clear that the federal
law as we now know it is not equal to the task alone."'1°2
While these conclusions seem correct, the legislature need not
accept on faith this or any other view on so important a question.
It could and should authorize and direct the state Attorney Gen-
eral to appoint a committee, composed of interested and knowl-
edgeable representatives of government and the teaching and
practicing bar, to study the problem and recommend solutions.
Lest it be thought that such an antitrust study committee would
be forced to operate in a vacuum, it is worth noting that a great
deal of careful thought has recently been devoted to state anti-
trust legislation. Several quiescent states have determined to put
some muscle into their trade regulation programs, and several
others have undertaken to adopt their first statutes.08
100. Id. at 873-74; Rahl, supra note 95, at 759-60; Stem, sura note 72,
at 717-18; Note, 61 CoLum. L. REv. 1469, 1472-73, 1495 (1961).
The interest of the Federal Trade Commission has become so great that it
has established an "Office of Federal-State Cooperation" to develop programs
of effective cooperation between the F.T.C. and state agencies responsible for
enforcing state antitrust laws. United States Senator Harrison A. Williams,
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Frauds and Misrepresentation Affecting
the Elderly of the Senate Special Committee on the Aging, immediately
expressed his approval of this step to encourage more effective state action.
F.T.C. News Summary No. 8 Wash. D. C. 20580, April 13, 1965.
101. Stern, supra note 72, at 718.
102. Rahl, supra note 95, at 711.
It is clear the Congress contemplated a federal-state partnership in anti-
trust enforcement. See HR. REP. No. 1707, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. (1890). Sen-
ator John Sherman, for whom the first federal antitrust act was named, be-
lieved that the object of federal legislation was "to supplement the enforce-
ment of the established rules of the common and statute law by the courts of
the several states." 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890).
103. See Coro. Rsv. STAT. AwN. §§ 55-4-1 through 4-6 (1963); HAwAni
Rn v. LAWS § 205 (Supp. 1963); WAsH. REv. ConE § 19.86.010-.920 (Supp.
1963). The Attorney General of Illinois is campaigning vigorously for a new
antitrust statute in the state. See BNA, ANTTUST Rn. REP. No. 206, p. A-12
(1965). The recent revival of state antitrust activity is summarized in Note,
8 N.Y.U.L. RLv. 575-76 (1968). This revival merely furthers restoration of
[Vol. 50:59
MINNESOTA ANTITRUST LAW
Perhaps even more important is the current movement for a
uniform state antitrust law to provide practical and coherent im-
plementation for state antitrust policy with a minimum of fric-
tion with the federal agencies. A first tentative draft of such a
statute has been submitted to the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws.'0 4 Basically, it follows the
federal antitrust laws but with modifications designed to focus
enforcement on localized restraints. Only the most common local
restraints - price-fixing among competitors, allocation of cus-
tomers and markets among competitors, collusive bidding, and
concerted refusals to deal - are specifically prohibited. Other
federal provisions, notably those dealing with mergers, are
omitted.
It has been suggested that such an omission is unfortunate,105
and at least one commentator has blocked out a model statute
that encompasses most of the restraints covered by federal legis-
lation.106 There is much to be said, however, for a more conserva-
tive approach. Anyone familiar with the tremendously complex
problems confronted in the course of litigation under the Clayton
and Robinson-Patman Acts must pause at the thought of burden-
ing a lightly staffed and relatively inexperienced state antitrust
office with the task of enforcing copies of these statutes 0 7 In all
probability there will be more than enough for such an office to
do, and much good for it to accomplish, in the prosecution of such
patently anticompetitive behavior as price-fixing and the boy-
cott. 08
the federal-state balance. "In their earliest beginnings, the antitrust statutes
were of state rather than federal origin." Wilson, The State Antitrust Laws, 47
AB.A.J. 160 (1961). "Before the Sherman Act was passed, fourteen states and
territories had constitutional prohibitions against monopolies: .... Even
more significantly, thirteen states had such statutory prohibitions . ... "
Unpublished paper of Minnesota Special Assistant Attorney General David
Lebedoff, which Mr. Lebedoff kindly made available to the author, a copy
of which is on file at the University of Minnesota Law Library.
104. See 5 TRADE REG. REP. 50,199 (August 28, 1968).
105. Arnold & Ford, Uniform State Antitrust Act: Toward Creation of a
National Antitrust Policy, 15 W. RES. L. REv. 102, 109 (1963).
106. See Stern, supra note 72.
107. In this respect, Minnesota may already have too much law, rather
than too little, in its obscure copy of that most obscure statute, the Robinson-
Patman Act. See Mn;N. STAT. § 325.03 (1961).
108.
To be effective, a state law undoubtedly should have the following
qualities. It must be broad enough substantively to reach all of the
serious and common restraints of trade. It should clearly cover the
two most common of all types-price fixing and allocation of
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In any event, there is ample material to support a meaningful
state antitrust study, and the need for such a study in Minnesota
is clear. Meanwhile, the legislature could take a giant stride to-
ward remedying the present situation within the framework of
existing law:
The most important suggestion may be made at the outset very quickly.
It is that for most states which now have a law, however antique it
may be, a resolution of the legislature directing the Attorney General
to enforce it and appropriating some money for that purpose would
mean more than a carload of new substantive provisions. For the basic
deficiency now is not lack of an ideal statute, but lack of a decision as
to whether the state really wants any antitrust law at all.109
One may go further and suggest that the state probably will
be in a better position to assess the adequacy of its present anti-
trust law, as well as the desirability of having any antitrust law,
if it has had an opportunity to observe the consequences of en-
forcing existing legislation. In addition, active enforcement would
remedy the present tendency of the law to disadvantage the
honest businessman, i.e., the businessman who refrains from a
course of conduct which he knows is against the law while his
less ethical competitor freely engages in such conduct knowing
markets....
Experience also suggests that there are certain things which a state
law should not do. State law in most instances will be starting from
scratch, confronted by a dismal half-century record of inactivity and
failure. Accordingly, caution and self-restraint are in order. The sub-
stantive law should not be smothered with unrealistic expectations.
It would 'be better to be content with prosecution of relatively simple
cases of clearly wrong behavior, especially price fixing and market allo-
cation, thereby embracing reasonable goals, than to seek experimentally
to fashion an ideal economic world and thereby accomplish nothing.
The state law should be slow to take on complex economic problems
associated with market structure, mergers, oligopoly and related prob-
lems, which are better left to federal policy. It should avoid blowing
itself out on "big" cases. And it should not tread too quickly upon
ground which is controversial among serious antitrust adherents.
Rahl, supra note 95, at 771-72. See Hanson & von Kalinowski, supra note 96,
at 32-33.
A draft bill introduced in the 1965 session of the legislature would have
reached both monopolization and acquisitions. See HF. No. 1631, April 1965.
The bill was not reported out of committee.
109. Rahl, supra note 95, at 755; accord, Hanson & von Kalinowski, supra
note 96, at 31-32; Note, 38 N.Y.U.L. REV. 575, 590 (1963).
In the unpublished paper cited supra note 103, Minnesota Special Assistant
Attorney General Lebedoff points out that California has six full-time antitrust
attorneys, New York has more than a dozen, and Texas recently had thirty
men working on a single antitrust case. By contrast, the Minnesota antitrust
unit consists of two attorneys and a part-time investigator. Even this limited
staff was not organized until 1961.
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he is not likely to be caught. Enforcement would also relieve the
practitioner of the uncomfortable moral problem of drawing a
distinction for his client between what is lawful and what is safe."0
The fact remains that one substantive problem, in particular,
cries out for immediate attention. This is the present statut6ry
provision requiring charter forfeiture or loss of the right to do
business in Minnesota whenever a corporation is found to have
violated the antitrust law, even in a suit brought by a private
party."' It is a truism that unrealistic penalties are not enforced.
It is difficult to imagine anything better calculated to dampen the
ardor of an Attorney General than the knowledge that success in
an ordinary, run-of-the-mill antitrust case is certain to lead to so
severe a punishment. Similarly, one sympathizes with the judge
who searches for a way - any way - to find for the defendant
and avoid such a result. Only the strike-suit plaintiff will take
comfort in this sanction.-Responsible proposals uniformly urge
that charter forfeiture be left to the discretion of the court,"' and
it is doubtful that any progress can be made in Minnesota anti-
trust enforcement until the statute is thus amended." 3 Even if a
study committee were to accomplish no more than this, it would
have more than justified its establishment.
V.
Present Minnesota trade regulation law has all the virtues of
a drifting derelict; it is a dangerous hazard to many wayfarer on
the lanes of commerce and an object of utility to virtually none.
There is a need for a fundamental reexamination of both the sub-
stance and the enforcement machinery of the state's antitrust
policy. Appointment of a Minnesota antitrust study committee
would pave the way for achievement of important basic reforms.
110.
When asked about a proposed price-fixing scheme, a California attorney
wrote to the president of the company concerned as follows: "As general
counsel for the company, I conclude that the proposed plan is illegal. In
my role as a member of the Board of Directors, however, I feel there is
very little chance it will be discovered."
Note, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 575 (1963).
111. See Miller v. Minneapolis Underwriters Ass'n, Inc., 226 Minn. 267, 82
N.W.2d 48 (1948), discussed in notes 19-22 supra and accompanying text.
112. See Hanson & von Kalinowski, supra note 96, at 33; Rahl, upra note
95, at 781; H.F. 1631, introduced into the 1965 session of the iinnesota legis-
lature but not reported out of committee, would have effected such a change.
However, it would also have wrought sweeping modifications of existing law
(e.g., to encompass monopolization and mergers) that seem better left to await
thorough study; see Stern, supra note 72, at 745.
113. The Wisconsin statute was so amended in 1949. Wis. STAT. § 133.245
(1963); see Note, 1951 Wis. L. REv. 657, 662.
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